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JUDGES AS AGENTS OF THE LAW 
Daniel Harris 
A spate of recent scholarship uses fiduciary metaphors to model the 
roles of various public officials. One such article in the California 
Law Review posits that judges are fiduciaries of the people and 
therefore have the power (akin to that of corporate directors) to do 
whatever is in the best interests of the people, even if that means 
disregarding precedents or statutes.  By contrast, a more traditional 
model sees judges as agents or servants of the law and therefore 
bound to follow the law rather than use it to advance their preferred 
policies.  
This essay examines both approaches with particular emphasis on 
their use in ordinary business litigation. The essay concludes that 
telling judges to act as fiduciaries of the people encourages court-
led social change. Telling judges they are agents of the law is more 
consistent with the judicial oath, the rule of law, and the role of 
courts in the American democratic system.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What should judges do in ordinary business litigation when the 
requirements of the law and the demands of justice seem to conflict? 
This question comes up all the time. The plaintiff has a sympathetic 
claim with a technical defect or gap in proof. The defendant’s 
conduct seems lawful but unfair or technically illegal but entirely 
reasonable. Conventional legal reasoning leads to one conclusion; 
gut instinct or sophisticated policy analysis leads to another. Which 
takes priority? 
In practice, of course, judges will strive for a decision that is 
consistent with both law and justice, adjusting their definitions of 
law and justice as needed to create an overlap. Failing that, judges 
will lean one way or another depending on a host of factors. But, in 
theory, what should judges do when law and substantive justice 
seem at odds? How should judges be encouraged to resolve the 
conflict? 
Opinion is divided on this issue. There are two leading schools 
of thought. Each has its preferred metaphor for the judicial role. One 
philosophy, which sees judges as fiduciaries or guardians of the 
people, believes that judges should prefer substantive justice over 
law. The opposing philosophy sees judges as agents or servants of 
the law who must do what the law requires.  
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE MODEL 
A. The Moral Imperative of Altruism 
The idea that judges should be impartial and decide cases in 
accordance with law has its critics. For many, it is preferable that 
judges do whatever they can to foster a more just, equitable and 
equal society.  
A 2017 article by Robin West calls one variant of this attitude 
“relational justice” and says it is based on a moral commitment to 
substantive equality and individual self-determination.1 To satisfy 
that commitment in the realm of contracts, for example, the law must 
go beyond “formal equality and a formal commitment to liberty” to 
ensure actual justice whenever parties “formally agreed” to 
contracts that are nevertheless “operating unconscionably upon 
them, or … lack the maturity to best determine sensible contract 
terms.”2  
A classic article in the Harvard Law Review by Duncan 
Kennedy dubs this philosophy “altruism” and contrasts it to the 
 
1.  See Robin West, The New Legal Criticism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 
144,151(2017),https://columbialawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/West
-final-read-PDF.pdf. 
2.  Id. at 152-53. 
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opposing theory of individualism.3 The altruist philosophy is based 
on what the 1976 article calls the “universal ideal of human 
brotherhood.”4 The “essence of altruism is the belief that one ought 
not to indulge a sharp preference for one’s own interest over those 
of others. Altruism enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to be 
merciful.”5  Altruism rejects the individualist idea of freedom. As 
the article explains: “The ‘freedom’ of individualism is negative, 
alienated and arbitrary. . . . We can achieve real freedom only 
collectively, through group self-determination.”6  
According to the Kennedy article, a key tenet of the altruist 
philosophy is that “there is simply no way for the judge to be 
neutral.”7 The common law rules of freedom of contract and private 
property reflect a deliberate choice to protect “the actions of the 
aggressive and competent even when those actions are directly at 
the expense of the weak.”8 Far from being apolitical or natural, these 
rules are an expression of “concrete individualist economic interests 
dressed up in gibberish.”9 Therefore, “[t]hose who enforce that legal 
order must accept responsibility for the allocation of resources and 
distribution of income it produces. . . . All outcomes are equally 
‘natural.’ The question is which one is best.”10 Judges cannot avoid 
personal responsibility for the unjust consequences of their 
decisions by saying they are just doing their jobs. According to the 
altruists, “[t]he dichotomy of the private and the official is 
untenable, and the judge must undertake to practice justice”11 even 
if that means ignoring settled law.  
This approach finds support in the pragmatic idea that law is “a 
means to an end, [a] purposeful human activity aimed at achieving 
social goals.”12 For many, this means that legal doctrines should be 
evaluated based on whether they advance a “progressive and 
enlightened” vision of social justice.13 If existing rules do not lead 
to proper results, those rules should be disregarded or changed.  
 
3.  See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976). 
4.  Id. at 1772. 
5.  Id. at 1717. 
6.  Id. at 1774. 
7.  Id. at 1766. 
8.  Id. at 1745. 
9.  Id. at 1749. 
10. Id. at 1748. 
11.  Id. at 1773. 
12.  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L. J. 943, 956 (1987). 
13.  See e.g. Curtis Nyquist, Re-Reading Legal Realism and Tracing a 
Genealogy of Balancing, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 771, 784 (2017). 
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An example of this approach in constitutional adjudication is a 
1986 article14 by Erwin Chemerinsky, now Dean of the University 
of California Law School. The article notes “that formalism is 
impossible in deciding cases and the inevitable discretion ensures 
that values enter into the interpretive process.”15 Given the necessity 
of choice, the article argues, the Supreme Court should choose 
progressive values over “the Framers’ values—values that were 
racist and sexist.”16  
Those who adhere to this philosophy reject theories of justice 
that direct judges to follow rules. As Anthony Sebok notes, the terms 
“formalism” and “positivism” are “’frequently used as an epithet” 
in modern academic circles.17 Indeed, some scholars go further and 
take on the shibboleth of the rule of law.  
A 1977 article in the Yale Law Journal by Morton Horwitz, for 
example, points out that while the rule of law “undoubtedly restrains 
power, . . . it also prevents power’s benevolent exercise.”18 The 
article goes on to criticize the rule of law because it “promotes 
substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that radically 
separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from 
outcomes.”19 The article also finds fault with the rule of law because 
“it enables the shrewd, the calculating, and the wealthy to 
manipulate its forms to their own advantage. And it ratifies and 
legitimates an adversarial, competitive, and atomistic conception of 
human relations.”20 
To similar effect is a 2003 article by David Kairys, which argues 
that “[t]he broad, grandiose vision of the rule of law . . . lends a false 
legitimacy to existing social and power relations.”21 Judges always 
have the option (and, indeed, the moral duty) to read progressive 
values into the law. Consequently, there is no legitimate excuse for 
judges who reach unjust results. As the article puts it: “the common 
theme of legal opinions – the law made me do it – is wrong and 
misleading.”22  
Another trope of this school of thought is that democracy is 
corrupt. Legislatures do not serve the public interest because 
 
14.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis 
of Professor Carter’s Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U. L. REV. 47 (1986). 
15.  Id. at 60. 
16.  Id. at 59. 
17.  Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 
1144 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).  
18.  Morton Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 
YALE L. J. 561, 566 (1977). 
19.  Id.  
20.  Id.  
21.  David Kairys, Searching for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
307, 320 (2003). 
22.  Id. at 322. 
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legislation is “a sale by legislators to interest groups.”23 As a 1991 
article by Einer Elhauge explains: “Modern interest group theory . . 
. offers a compelling explanation for something we all know is true: 
our democratic system regularly produces some results that appear 
contrary to the interests of the general public.”24  
Judges, on the other hand, are viewed positively. For example, a 
1989 article by William Eskridge suggests that courts are better able 
to “articulate public values” because their “independence reduces 
the inertia and interest group pressures of everyday politics, and 
because their open, reasoned, and incremental [decision-making] 
assures a more rational discussion of public issues.”25 
Under the principle that law should be construed to advance the 
public good, it follows for these scholars that appellate judges 
should, must and therefore do have the power to “make decisions 
for society” based on what they determine “to be the public’s 
intermediate-and long-term best interests” even if their “choices . . . 
are not entirely in accordance with legislative will, current public 
sentiment, or the existing body of case law and settled principles.”26 
Great judges, it is said, are the ones who use this power most 
freely.27 All judges should be encouraged to follow their example. 
As a 2007 article by Neil Siegel explains: “there is much to be said 
. . . for judicial boldness and even heroism in appropriate cases. 
Some of the most celebrated Supreme Court opinions in American 
history were hardly models of judicial restraint.”28  
B. Judges as Guardians or Fiduciaries of the People 
A 2013 article in the California Law Review entitled A 
Fiduciary Theory of Judging29 by Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet and 
Michael Serota brings these ideas together and combines them with 
the burgeoning field of fiduciary theory to provide a conceptual 
justification for an expansive view of the judicial role. The article 
 
23.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of 
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285 n.35 
(1988). 
24.  Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive 
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L. J. 31, 32 (1991). 
25.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1016 (1989).  
26.  Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. 
REV. 1307, 1330 (1995). 
27.  See Edmund Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner, 
Henry Friendly, and Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 
1267 (2009). 
28.  Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 
CONST. COMMENTARY 701, 705 (2007). 
29.  Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of 
Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013). 
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starts and concludes that judges are, in fact, fiduciaries of the people, 
stating: “To say that judges hold the public’s interest in trust is more 
than mere rhetoric or analogy; the people are the real beneficiaries 
and judges should conform their conduct to fiduciary standards.”30  
Fiduciaries come in many varieties. Some, like servants, are 
bound to follow orders. Others, like guardians, have discretion to do 
whatever they deem to be in the best interest of their charge. The 
article likens judges to guardians and other fiduciaries with broad 
discretion by describing judges as to “‘trustees’ of some kind: 
independent but loosely constrained by precedent and the 
authorization to try to develop standards over time, subject only to 
impeachment or elections for accountability.”31 At another point, 
the article compares judges to corporate directors, saying “that 
judges have wide discretion in performing their duties of care, 
consistent with a translation of the ‘business judgment rule,’ as 
applied to judicial business.”32 
These broad powers, the article explains, do not require 
legislative authority or an electoral mandate, but instead accrue to 
judges from their status as fiduciaries. As the article notes, “neither 
implied nor express consent are essential components of the 
fiduciary architecture. Most obviously, guardians who act on behalf 
of minors or incompetents do so on the basis of trust reposed without 
consent.” 33 The article goes on to note that this “fiduciary rendering 
of [judicial power] provides a useful counterpoint to the 
conventional liberal account of legitimate democratic authority, 
grounded in the consent of the governed.”34  
Reasoning from these premises, the article concludes that judges 
have both the power and the duty to do whatever is in the best 
interests of the people. This includes the power to do what the 
legislature should have done to protect the people. As the article puts 
it, “in those instances where the legislature has failed in its fiduciary 
capacity, the judge as fiduciary may look to the people, the ultimate 
beneficiary, directly.” 35  “These situations require judges to 
reengage in direct fiduciary protection of the public through their 
decision making.”36 The fiduciary authority of judges also includes 
the power to override precedent. As the article explains, recognition 
of the “wide discretion” of judges should “enable judicial innovation 
by encouraging risk taking by judges.”37   
 
30.  Id. at 721. 
31.  Id. at 701. 
32.  Id. at 737. 
33.  Id. at 707. 
34.  Id. at 712. 
35.  Id. at 748. 
36.  Id. at 749. 
37.  Id. at 737. 
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III. CRITIQUE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE MODEL 
The fiduciary theory proposed by Leib, Ponet and Serota would 
repurpose the judiciary into a spearhead for moral progress and 
social change. For those who agree with the authors’ agenda, their 
article provides a valuable blueprint. For those who disagree, the 
article illustrates the flaws of a tempting but mistaken approach to 
judging.  
A. Which People? 
Taken literally, the mandate that judges act as fiduciaries of the 
people puts judges in a hopeless conflict position. There is, in fact, 
no monolithic “people.” Society is composed of “a bunch of 
individuals” (associated with each other in many different groups).38 
These individuals have differing interests, so that “on most issues 
the people’s interests will diverge and will often be in direct 
conflict.”39 
Therefore, telling judges they should decide cases based on the 
best interest of the people gives no meaningful guidance. A 1930 
article by the legal realist Karl Llewellyn makes this point well by 
asking: “Where is the unity, the single coherent group? Where is the 
demonstrable objective which is social, and not opposed by groups 
well nigh as important as those which support it?”40 
To make sense of a charge to act as popular fiduciaries, judges 
would need to select particular groups of people to treat as 
surrogates for the people as a whole and give lesser weight to the 
interests of other groups. Two recent articles in the California Law 
Review anticipate this need by offering formulae that judges could 
use in selecting favored and disfavored groups.41  
But judging is supposed to be impersonal and impartial. 
Decisions should not depend on whether litigants come from groups 
that the judge likes, hates or fears. The federal judicial oath 42 
requires judges to “swear (or affirm) that [they] will administer 
justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and 
 
38.  Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1606 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004)). 
39.  D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 
719 (2013). 
40.  Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence — The Next Step, 30 
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 461 (1930). 
41.  See Aaron Tang, Rethinking Political Power in Judicial Review, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 1755 (2018) (formula for picking disfavored groups); Bertrall L. 
Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and 
the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2016) (formula for picking favored groups). 
42.  See 28 U.S.C. § 453. 
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to the rich, and that [they will discharge their legal duties] faithfully 
and impartially . . . ”43 Similarly, the “common law judicial oath . . 
. binds a judge to ‘do right to all manner of people . . . without fear 
or favor, affection or ill-will[.]’”44 The same idea appears in the 
Bible. Right after the prohibitions against cursing the deaf and 
putting stumbling blocks before the blind, the Bible says: "You shall 
do no injustice in court. You shall not be partial to the poor or defer 
to the great, but in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor."45  
Consider the consequences of departure from this norm. Once it 
becomes clear that judges are puissant policymakers who favor the 
interests of particular groups, various groups would vie (even more 
than they do today) to put their champions on the bench. The 
outcome of these struggles would vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. In some places, dominant law firms might prevail. In 
others, big business might come out on top. In still other 
jurisdictions, small business or the working class or members of 
particular racial or religious groups might dominate. In other places, 
the police might succeed. 
The law would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (or from 
courtroom to courtroom) depending on the affiliation of the resident 
judges. Some courts might strike down minimum wage laws based 
on testimony from economic experts that the regulations are 
contrary to the best interests of the people. Other courts might 
double the minimum wage based on reports from other experts that 
the rate prescribed by the legislature is too low. It is even possible 
that some judges might take orders from their political leaders and 
permit abuses of executive power.  
The dystopian possibilities can be seen in the history of 
revolutionary tribunals, vigilance committees and politicized courts. 
For example (to quote Cass Sunstein), “in the Nazi period, German 
judges rejected formalism. They did not rely on the ordinary or 
original meaning of legal texts. On the contrary, they thought that 
statutes should be construed in accordance with the spirit of the age, 
defined by reference to the Nazi regime.”46  
B. Popular Champions? 
But suppose that the fiduciary of the people model of judging 
just nudges the judiciary into a more activist role, so that judges take 
bolder action and exercise wider discretion to promote what they 
 
43.  Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A 
Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 25 (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 453. 
44.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 445 (2015). 
45.  Leviticus 19:15 (English Standard Version). 
46.  Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism be Defended Empirically, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 636, 636 (1999). 
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believe to be the public interest. Would that be a good thing? Not 
necessarily. 
Judges are unlikely popular champions. As James Andrew 
Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur point out: “The life experiences of 
judges are overwhelmingly white, male, and affluent.”47 Moreover, 
judges do not have the data or expertise needed to assess the interests 
of the people or to figure out how those interests can best be served. 
As a 1988 article by Judge Michael McConnell notes, “[Judges] are 
carefully insulated from the real world.”48 They are not personally 
accountable for the practical impact of their decisions or even 
generally aware of them.49 “They are dependent for information and 
ideas upon people with an inherent professional axe to grind.”50 
Furthermore, judges do not have the time to determine how they 
might better advance the people’s best interests. “Their caseloads . . 
. are overwhelming.”51  
If judges were required to make decisions based on the public 
interest, they would likely equate the unknowable public interest 
with something they do know, such as their own values and the 
values of their class.52 As a result, “[i]t is hardly clear that liberating 
those who wield legal power from the ‘mistaken’ belief that legal 
doctrine constrains their actions will have a progressive effect.”53 
Consider history. As David Kairys points out, the “the courts have 
more often been a barrier to [progressive] human rights than a means 
for their realization.”54Alternatively, consider how today’s Supreme 
Court (no doubt believing it is acting in the best interests of the 
people) has been reinterpreting the First Amendment in a way that 
Amy Kapczynski denounces as a “market-supremacist” attack on 
“democratic governance.”55  
Also, as a 2019 article by Uri Weiss points out, increased 
uncertainty as to the enforceability of rights "stimulates the transfer 
 
47.  James Andrew Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur, Judicial Diversity: Where 
Independence and Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REV. 775, 785–86 (2004).  
48.  Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional 
Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 106 (1988). 
49.  Id. at 106 (“judges are irresponsible in the most fundamental sense: they 
are not accountable for the consequences of their decisions and ordinarily are not 
even aware of them.”).  
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. at 105 (“judges are more likely to impose upon us the prejudices of 
their class.”).  
53.  Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical 
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 500 (1987). 
54.  David Kairys, Searching for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
307, 323 (2003). 
55.  Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA: 
Toward a More Democratic Political Economy: Response to the Columbia Law 
Review’s 2018 Symposium, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179, 195 (2018). 
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of wealth from risk-averse to risk-neutral people via settlements. 
Therefore, because poor people are more risk-averse than rich 
people are, legal uncertainty transfers wealth from the poor to the 
rich.”56 
Interestingly, libertarians such as Randy Barnett endorse the 
idea of judges as fiduciaries of the people but see the mission as the 
protection of liberty. 57  Other scholars have doubts about this 
program. A 2007 article by Thomas McAfee warns that rather than 
providing “the ticket to ‘rights nirvana.’ . . . the ‘freedom’ we 
thereby grant to courts is as likely to lead to injustice and the denial 
of basic rights as it is to advance [worthy] goals.”58 A 2018 article 
by Mark Pulliam calls it a “sophomoric reverie to imagine that 
enlightened judges will always be on the right side of history.”59 
After all, the article notes, “judges are just government officials 
wearing robes, not High Priests whose rulings are infallible or 
divinely inspired.”60  
C. Democracy 
Another flaw in the idea that judges should make decisions 
based on the best interests of the people, rather than legislative 
directives, is that it is inconsistent with constitutional democracy. 
Under our system, the people are sovereign and have the right, 
within limits prescribed by the Constitution, “to govern themselves 
through representative self-government.”61 A corollary principle is 
“that all legitimate authority, including that of judges, stems initially 
from the consent of the governed.” 62  In other words, “all 
government officials are mere agents, exercising only such authority 
as is delegated by law.”63  
Legislation is a task delegated to the elected legislatures. Judges 
are supposed to decide cases based on the evidence and the law. 
Obviously, this involves some discretion in figuring out what the 
law means. But under democratic theory the discretion is one of a 
subordinate, not a superior. Thus, for example, in interpreting 
statutes, (to quote John Manning, now Dean of Harvard Law 
 
56.  Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty, 2019 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 149, 182 (2019). 
57.  See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 43. 
58.  Thomas B. McAfee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal 
Thought: The Presumption in Favor of Liberty over Law and the Court over the 
Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1588–89 (2007). 
59.  Mark Pulliam, Unleashing the “Least Dangerous” Branch: Quis 
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 22 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 423, 458 (2018). 
60.  Id. at 463. 
61.  Id. at 439. 
62.  McConnell, supra note 48, at 92. 
63.  John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. 
L. REV. 113, 145 (1998–1999). 
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 41 [2020], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol41/iss2/1
Spring Issue 2020] Harris 11 
School) “it is widely assumed that federal judges must act as 
Congress’s faithful agents.”64 Giving judges the power to disregard 
statutes whenever they believe the legislature has failed to act in the 
best interests of the people, the-fiduciary-of-the-people thesis 
violates “the bedrock principle of our constitutional government—
popular sovereignty.”65 The thesis invites (indeed, requires) judges 
to “usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected 
legislature” 66  and engage in what a 1988 article by Michael 
McConnell describes as “the judicial equivalent of a coup d’etat.”67 
Or, as Mark Pulliam puts it in attacking a libertarian version of 
judicial activism: “By giving unelected federal judges carte blanche 
to second-guess all federal, state, and local laws, the theory of 
judicial engagement effectively eviscerates state sovereignty and 
makes the American people wards of the federal courts . . . ”68  
Over the years, different sides have made the argument for 
democracy. A century ago, progressives who felt frustrated by a 
conservative judiciary sounded the theme. Thus, a 1921 book by 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo says that judges deciding cases based on 
their “individual sense of justice . . . might result in a benevolent 
despotism if the judges were benevolent [but it] would put an end to 
the reign of law.”69  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the pro-democracy 
rhetoric became a conservative trope. For example, a dissent by 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor states: “the Constitution does not 
constitute us as ‘Platonic Guardians’ . . . ”70 A dissent by Justice 
Hugo Black (once a liberal hero) says that for the Supreme Court to 
use theories of “‘natural justice,’ . . . or whatnot to veto federal or 
state laws simply takes away from Congress and States the power to 
make laws based on their own judgment of fairness and wisdom and 
transfers that power to this Court . . . ”71  
In this century, the conservatism of the current Supreme Court 
has led many on the left to return to the pro-democracy argument for 
limiting courts. As a 2008 article by Josh Benson notes, these “Anti-
 
64.  John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2001). 
65.  Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist 
Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1575 (2010). 
66.  Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947). 
67.  McConnell, supra note 48, 97. 
68.  Pulliam, supra, note 58, at 439.  
69.  BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 136 
(1921). 
70.  City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 
(1983) (O’Connor, J., joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
71.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 (1965) (Black, J. 
dissenting). 
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Court scholars [believe] that the American political process is robust 
and open; that courts intervening against it are undemocratic; that 
lawyers, judges, and academics are to be regarded as dangerous 
elites; and that judicial power stifles grassroots empowerment.”72    
D. The Rule of Law 
The theory that judges should decide cases based on the best 
interests of the people, rather than laws, also violates the rule of law 
(sometimes called the “Rule of Law”): the principle that the rights 
of individuals are to be determined through the impartial 
application 73  of “rules previously declared” 74  and not by the 
arbitrary will of government officials. 75  This principle, and the 
corresponding ideal of a government of laws, provides 
“predictability, certainty and stability.” 76  It gives people the 
freedom to exercise their rights under the protection of the law.77 
And it promotes equality because decisions are not based on the 
identity of the parties.  
The Rule of Law requires judges to decide based on the legality 
of the defendant’s actions at the time of challenged conduct.78 But 
the fiduciary of the people model of judging requires a different 
approach. Technical legality or illegality of past conduct is not 
controlling. The question, rather, is about the future: whether a 
decision for one party or the other would be in the best interests of 
those people who matter to the judge79.  
The fiduciary model also undermines the idea that judges speak 
as and for the law and, therefore, should be accorded the respect that 
the law's authority commands.80  Consider J. Harvie Wilkinson’s 
comments about pragmatic judging: “Pragmatic judges are 
‘forward-looking’ and ‘future-oriented,’ have a ‘taste for empirical 
inquiry,’ and lack any sense of duty to the traditional sources of legal 
 
72.  Josh Benson, The Past Does Not Repeat Itself, but It Rhymes: The 
Second Coming of the Liberal Anti-Court Movement, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
1071, 1074–75 (2008). 
73.  See Richard H. Jr. Fallon, ‘The Rule of Law” As a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997). 
74.  See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 209 (rev. ed. 1969). 
75.  See Don Herzog, As Many As Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 
75 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 626 (1987). 
76.  Alexander & Solum, supra note 38, at 1629. 
77.  See William H. Jr. Pryor, Hayek and Textualism, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 893, 914 (2018). 
78.  See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 513, 568 (2015). 
79.  Id. at 568 (discussing how Leib, Serota, and Ponet proposal requires 
prospective analysis). 
80.  See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the 
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62–63 (1965). 
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authority. In a very real sense, these attributes mean pragmatists 
aren’t really judges after all . . . .”81  
IV. SERVANT OF THE LAW MODEL OF JUDGING 
A. Agency and the Oath 
If judges are not fiduciaries of the people, what are they? There 
are other ways to characterize the role and set a frame from which 
norms can be deduced. One way matches up well with how judges 
conceive their job. Under this alternative, judges are agents or 
servants. Technically, they are government servants; practically and 
metaphorically, judges are agents or servants of the law. 
To understand why casting judges as agents makes a difference, 
definitions are helpful. According to the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency: “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one 
person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) 
that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the 
principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise 
consents so to act.”82 A servant (now called an “employee”) is an 
agent whose principal (formerly called “master” but now known as 
“employer”) has the right to control the physical details of how the 
servant carries out the job.83  
Thus, agents and servants differ from guardians and trustees in 
three crucial ways. First, the creation of the agency relationship 
requires the assent of the principal. Second, the agent acts “on 
behalf” of the principal: meaning that the agent acts as the principal 
(not simply for the benefit of the principal), so that the actions of the 
agent within the scope of the agency are deemed to be the actions of 
principal.84 Third, the agent is subject to the control of the principal. 
The agent must follow the lawful instructions of the principal and 
reasonably interpret those instructions so as to further the known 
wishes and purposes of the principal.85  
Technically, judges are government employees. In a practical 
and metaphoric sense, however, judges can be seen as agents or 
servants of the law. To assume office, judges must take an oath, 
prescribed by law, in which they pledge loyalty and obedience to the 
law in much the same way that a servant would pledge loyalty and 
 
81.  J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY 
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 95 
(2012). 
82.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW. INST., 2006). 
83.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 (AM. LAW. INST., 1958). 
84.  See Daniel Harris, The Lost Rationale of Agency Law, 3 BUS. & FIN. L. 
REV. 1 (2019); Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 168–69 (Del. Ch. 
2003). 
85.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e, 2.01, 8.09 (AM. 
LAW. INST., 2006); Id. § 2.01; Id. § 8.09. 
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obedience to a master. Once in office, judges act on behalf of the 
law. Their rulings are treated as law and not as their personal 
opinions. Furthermore, judges are bound to follow the law in 
carrying out their duties.  
The language of the oath reinforces the idea that judges are 
acting as servants of the law. The federal judicial oath requires a 
judge to “solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice 
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the 
rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform 
all the duties incumbent upon me as [Judge or Justice] under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”86 
Of course, treating the law as the judges’ master (even 
metaphorically) requires reification of the law. But that is precisely 
the point. A key function of agency theory is to enable intangible 
legal fictions such as corporations to operate in the real world 
through representation by human agents.87 The Rule of Law is an 
intangible legal fiction that is vital to our society. For the Rule of 
Law to operate, it needs human agents in the same way that a 
corporation needs employees. Judges (and others) perform that role.  
Interestingly, the Constitution anticipates its need for judges to 
act as its human agents. Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution 
provides that all “judicial Officers, both of the United States and of 
the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support 
this Constitution . . . .”88 As Chief Justice John Marshall pointed out 
in Marbury v. Madison, “the framers of the constitution 
contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, 
as well as of the legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges 
to take an oath to support it?”89  
B. The Ideology of the Judiciary 
The idea that judges are agents or servants of the law also has 
the support of the current Chief Justice of the United States. At his 
confirmation hearing, John Roberts defended the idea of an 
impartial judiciary by comparing judges to umpires. In that same 
testimony, he also stated: “judges and Justices are servants of the 
law, not the other way around.”90 At a ceremony in 2018, the Chief 
Justice repeated the idea, saying that “a certain humility should 
 
86.  28 U.S.C. § 453. 
87.  See Harris, supra note 84. 
88.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
89.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 179–80 (1803). 
90.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
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characterize the judicial role. Judges and justices are servants of the 
law, not the other way around.”91 
The word "servant" is an old-fashioned word associated with 
old-fashioned virtues such as loyalty, obedience and respect for 
authority. The Chief Justice's use of the word is a prime for 
traditional morality. It is also the first step in an argument for a 
conservative version of the judicial role. The statement that judges 
are servants of the law leads naturally to the conclusion that judges 
are bound to follow the law in the same way servants are bound to 
obey their master. The next phrase "not the other way around" 
rejects the progressive idea that judges should use the law to 
improve society or otherwise advance their preferred policy agenda. 
The bottom line is very similar to something Chief Justice John 
Marshall said on behalf of the Supreme Court in 1824: “Courts are 
the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing . . . Judicial 
power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will 
of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of 
the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.”92 
The servant model is also better for the Rule of Law. This 
approach is consistent with democratic theory because it accords 
pride of place to the elected legislature when it comes to changing 
the law. Jurisprudence is more stable. Cases are decided (with rare 
exceptions) based on the law as it was at the time the parties acted 
and not on how the law should be going forward. Judges play a 
neutral role, taking the law as given. They do not act as partisans for 
some theory of social change or moral progress.  
Both parts of the servant-of-the-law model have practical 
advantages for the judiciary and its traditional ideology. The word 
"servant" (rather than director or guardian) indicates that judges will 
play a subordinate role.  Courts will not undertake to legislate; 
judges will follow the constitutional directives of the legislature and 
lower court judges will obey higher courts. The servant model also 
evokes the virtue of self-abnegating identification with the master 
(i.e. the law), which makes it easier for judges to become their role, 
follow authority, and carry out the unpleasant parts of the job, such 
as sending people to prison.  
Making the law the “master” gives judges a job they know how 
to do and saves them from a task that is beyond their expertise. If 
judges were required to decide based on the best interests of the 
people, they would be at sea. Analyzing legal materials, by contrast, 
is their strong suit. And if judges consider policy when resolving 
ambiguities in the law, that consideration is incidental to their 
primary task of discerning the intent and meaning of the law. 
 
91.  Chief Justice John Roberts, About the William H. Rehnquist Award, 
54(1) CT. REV. 1, 44 (2018). 
92.  Osborn v. President, Directors & Co. of Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824).  
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Moreover, because they are serving the law, not the general public, 
judges can give greater weight in their policy analysis to the interests 
of the legal system, such as consistency with precedent93 and ease 
of judicial administration.94 
Still another advantage of subordinating judges to the law is that 
it preserves the independence of the judiciary. If judges were 
servants of the government, they could not be impartial when 
adjudicating disputes between citizens and the government. If 
judges were servants of the people, judges would be pressured to 
defer to elected officials who have a direct mandate from the people 
and a better sense of what the people want. By contrast, as servants 
of the law, judges have home field advantage. They are interpreting 
the commands of a master they know better than anyone else. As 
Chief Justice John Marshall said on behalf of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Marbury v. Madison in 1803: “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”95  
The word “servant” sounds humble. But sometimes servants 
must display great initiative to figure out what the master means and 
how best to carry out the master’s wishes.  
C. Academic Opinion 
Some scholars support the notion that judges should serve the 
law. For instance, a 2015 article by Paul Miller and Andrew Gold 
posits that some fiduciaries may be “engaged to determine or 
advance certain abstract purposes.”96 As examples, the article cites 
charitable trustees97 and judges.98 Also in support is a 2017 book by 
Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, which says that “the specific task 
with which federal judges are charged is to decide cases by law.”99 
Similarly, a 2005 article by Sarah Cravens sees judges as “trustees” 
entrusted with the care of the common law and, therefore, obliged 
“to uphold and maintain” the corpus of that law “in individual cases 
in accordance with the underlying aims of the corpus.”100  
Along these same lines, a recent book by Randy Kozel argues 
that judges following precedent, rather than their own personal 
vision of justice, “is a valuable thing in a system that aspires to 
 
93.  See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991). 
94.  See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L. J. 909, 994 
(2016). 
95.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
96.  Miller & Gold, supra, note 78, at 517. 
97.  Id. at 528. 
98.  Id. at 570. 
99.  GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY 146 
(2017). 
100.  See Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an 
Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REEV. 1637, 1639-40 (2005). 
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promote the rule of law as opposed to the rule of individual men and 
women.”101 “Judges come and go, but the law remains the law.”102 
Paul Horwitz also endorses “an office-centered vision of justice” 
that requires judges to identify with their office and not remake the 
law based on their personal views.103 
A similar idea in the field of statutory construction—that judges 
should act as faithful agents of the legislature, not as independent 
policy makers—has the support of scholars such as John 
Manning,104 Jonathan Molot105 and Judge Amy Coney Barrett.106 In 
the same vein, a 2010 article by Thomas Merrill points out that if 
judges were to interpret statutes based on the best interests of 
society, the law would constantly change depending on the policy 
views of the most recent decision-maker.” 107  Similarly, a 2017 
article by William Baude and Stephen Sachs argues that rules of 
interpretation for resolving statutory ambiguities are needed to fill 
“gaps that would otherwise be filled by the interpreter’s normative 
priors.”108  
On the other hand, many scholars reject the idea of judges 
following law. 109  In their view, the legalistic approach limits 
adaptation to changing circumstances and dooms decision-making 
“to mediocrity by mandating the inaccessibility of excellence.”110 A 
related criticism is that “[b]ecause the rules that determine existing 
legal rights and duties were ... established in the past, ‘legalism … 
has a … conservative hue.’”111 Or as a 2019 article by W. Bradley 
Wendel on legal advice puts it: “If the only reasons that count … are 
those that are part of existing law, then legal discourse itself will 
 
101.  RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 6 
(2017). 
102.  Id. at 176. 
103.  Paul Horwitz, The Constitutional Marriage of Personality and 
Impersonality: Office, Honor and the Oath, 33 CONST. COMMENTARY 343, 353 
(2018) (reviewing RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF 
PRECEDENT (2017)). 
104.  See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1999). 
105.  See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (2006). 
106.  See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 109 (2010). 
107.  See Merrill, supra note 65, at 1587. 
108.  William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 139 
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1097 (2017). 
109.  See Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 911, 932-33 (2018). 
110.  Fredrick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 539 (1988). 
111.  Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 
B.U. L. REV. 209, 255 (2015). 
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tend to ratify existing maldistributions of wealth and power in 
society.”112  
Another critique is that legalism is a fiction that allows judges to 
avoid personal responsibility. To quote a 2007 article by J.C. 
Olesen: “By treating themselves as humble servants of the law … 
judges can indulge in a mythic illusion” and thereby “become blind 
to the consequences of their decisions.”113 To similar effect, a 1930 
book by Jerome Frank characterizes the idea of judges following law 
as “pretense” and “self-delusion” and says judges “must rid 
themselves of this reliance on a non-existent guide, they must learn 
the virtue, the power and the practical worth of self-authority.”114 
D. Judicial Practice 
In practice, do judges follow the law or their own sense of 
justice? When asked, judges say the law determines the outcome 
about ninety percent of the time.115 This includes many cases the 
judge would prefer to see come out the other way. To quote U.S. 
Court of Appeals Judge Theodore A. McKee: “judges often render 
decisions that achieve a result they do not like and enforce laws they 
do not agree with. . . . It is not something we like to do, but it is 
something that we do routinely regardless of the level of personal 
difficulty.”116  
Academics tend to focus on the most politically charged cases. 
A broader sample indicates that judging (particularly in the lower 
federal courts) is not as partisan or free-wheeling as some might 
assume. A 2013 study found Republican-appointed U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices voted conservatively 57% of the time while 
Democratic Supreme Court appointees voted conservatively 40% of 
the time, for a partisan difference of 17%. The comparable partisan 
gap for the courts of appeal was 4.5%.117 So it appears professional 
norms do in fact “produce much more consensus than would be 
 
112.  W. Bradley Wendel, The Rule of Law and Legal-Process Reasons in 
Attorney Advising, 99 B.U. L. REV. 109, 169 (2019). 
113.  J.C. Oleson, The Antigone Dilemma: When the Paths of Law and 
Morality Diverge, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 689 (2007). 
114.  JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 130-31 (1930). 
115.  See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A 
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 286 
(1997). 
116.  Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 
1709 (2007). 
117.  See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE 168 (2013). 
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expected if judges’ decisions mirrored the disagreements in 
legislative bodies or political debates.”118  
V. CONCLUSION 
Neither of the models discussed in this Essay establish 
algorithms for judges to follow. Both are metaphors designed to 
prime thought and influence behavior. In practice, many judges 
operate with both in mind and strive to make decisions consistent 
with both. When forced to choose, they answer the easier question: 
going with justice if the law is ambiguous or with law if there is no 
intuitively just result.  
But, in theory, which model should be the norm? What should 
judges be told to do in ordinary business litigation when the two 
metaphors clearly point in opposite directions and the conflict 
between law and justice seems inescapable? While the call of justice 
is tempting, telling judges they should act as agents or servants of 
the law, and not assume the role of guardians of the people, is more 
consistent with the judicial oath, stability, freedom, democracy, 




118.  FRANK EASTERBROOK, FORWARD TO SCALIA & GARNER: READING LAW: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxiv (2012). 
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